Free Rdp Serial Port Redirection Attack

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Free Rdp Serial Port Redirection Attack

Several potential solutions come to mind: One: Win7 UAC may be the culprit with COM access. Find a way to give the user access to Com. To diagnose this, first try to copy a local file (from computer console, not from tssession). Then try the same as an admin. Perhaps admin the user for a short period of time.

If this is the case, it might be fixed with a GPO in the vicinity of 'Computer Configuration Policies Administrative Templates System '. You want to allow users to use com and change its settings. Two: You may share the printer on the tsclient, and use it on the server. To hide the local printer from network view, share it with 'show in directory' off, and the share name ending in '$'. Say 'hiddenprint$' - shares ending with $ dont show in the explorer.

Then 'copy file.prn tsclient hiddenprint$'.

Is there a way to block brute force attempts against our RDP server with our Sonicwall NSA 5600? It really should have this built in, but I can't seem to find it. And I haven't figured out how to create a custom rule to do it in the Application Firewall. I did at least set hours that connections are allowed, but need to do more, as I see brute force attacks in the Windows Server log going on all day.

I've seen programs that will do this for you automatically with the Windows Firewall, by reading the Windows log for repeated failed logins, but I'd rather do it at the Sonicwall, if it's possible. Yeah I don't think SonicWall can do that automatically. That's what we used for some clients: Ideally you'd want a different port than 3389 and even better setup a VPN. If you want to block RDP access completely just go to firewall rules, and find the rule that is WAN ->LAN allow on port 3389 and set it to deny. EDIT: If you see brute force traffic coming in, we usually just manually block those, I have not found a way to automate that on the SonicWall, you get setup GEO filtering what helps quite a bit as well, especially if you notice the brute force always comes from the same region. We were mainly hit from China and Russia lol.

Edited Apr 15, 2016 at 11:48 UTC. Brianwhelton wrote: Sid Phiilips wrote: I don't know why people still do this. A company that I just replaced was having some problems with a site to site VPN, so they just NAT'd 3389 to the terminal server.

What could possibly go wrong.? Yeah, here's the best part. Their hourly rate? Half again mine. They had been jacking around with this VPN for days, then cobbled it. Sent them a bill for $1600. I registered, configured (including 3 site-to-site VPNs), traveled to three locations, for $1300.

I got the bulk of the installation done in one day. If you cannot for whatever reason use a VPN for RDP, at the least, add 'user login required' setup to the firewall first before it opens your alternate port. I have my WatchGuard firewall set to require firewall login, which also has Duo two-factor auth on it, before it opens my RDP port, which is not 3389.

I set 3389 as a bait port in my HackAttacks policy. Anything hitting my firewall on certain ports automatically gets put onto the blocked sites list, so even if I have for example port 25 open, if they hit port 22 or 23 first, they get blocked and never see any other ports that may be open. Sorry, but all the people responding above that 'a VPN is a good idea because it brings the connection into your network' are beyond misguided. That is a a *horrible* idea - because you're bringing un-managed endpoints into your network directly - and I am willing to bet in 99% of cases, you don't have anything in place to stop something once it's inside your network (and no, AV isn't going to help).

The *last* thing you want is someone in your network with their home PC and all their malware and ransomware and stuff being inserted via VPN directly into the middle of your network - and with domain authentication lumped in with it. All this does is give their insecure home PC a direct run at your files, with all the permissions the user has. AV on your server isn't going to stop the user VPNing into your network from home, getting ransomware and then using their account credentials to bork your fileserver. Bad, bad, BAD idea. RDP is *not* inherently insecure. Traffic is encrypted via SSL natively and whatever crap the user has on their end PC is not automatically run in your network, when they make an RDP connection. If you give the user a tightly locked down RDP or RemoteApp then *all* they can do is open Word and edit documents (or whatever you allow).

They cannot get ransomware on their home PC and spread it into the network. They cannot open Chrome and watch youporn. They can't do anything you don't allow on the RDP server. It is, without a doubt, far more secure than a VPN. People saying 'use a VPN' have not thought this through, I am afraid. If you are using a password (and I bet it's the same one, and no 2FA in place) to log in via RDP or VPN, then your *only* line of defence is that password - so a VPN is no harder to break into than RDP (both should have a lockout policy in effect but again, the VPN is less likely to than RDP). There is no 'extra security' on VPN.

Please stop spreading this nonsense. VPNs are designed to extend a network - not provide security. Just think about that for a second.

You're extending your network into your user's house. Do you *really* think this is a good idea? True, Trevor. If you're using a VPN to connect to managed locations and thereby not allowing RDP to the outside world, that is fine and good.

But all the VPN is doing is acting like a giant cat5 cable running to the other point, so you bring all the problems of that other point into your network. Chuck D Autobiography Of Mistachuck Rar Files there. What you're doing sounds good. I work in IT security and this is a real bug-bear of mine (as you can probably tell!) because I come across it all the time.

IT departments think providing users with a (often Windows) VPN (using exactly the same password as the RDP server) they can connect to, and then use RDP is somehow a good idea. I try to explain to them it has the exact same level of entry protection (the same, single password and username) but it comes with the massive drawback that once you're in, you have free roam of the network. At least with RemoteApp you can allow people to RDP directly to a single application and only that application.

Coupled with proper whitelisting on the RDP head and the user cannot do anything else - all they can do is open (for example) MS Word or MS Excel and that's it. Sure they can still go and browse folders from within Excel and manually delete things - but at least all the crap and malware on their PC isn't directly injected into your network. RDP should be fine to expose to the world. Just go get a free or cheap DuoSecurity add in and this gives you 2FA on your box, so you can't login without a password and a phone. If you also want to block RDP brute force (which is somewhat negated by 2FA), then just add this one line to your IPtables rules (if available): iptables -I FORWARD -p tcp --dport 3389 -i eth0 -m state --state NEW -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 10 -j DROP That will drop anyone who tries to make 10 new connections to RDP in under a minute.

This will work on Linux routers, EdgeOS, VyOS, Vyatta, etc. I too had concerns setting up a VPN to home computers. Can I please ask your opinions of our VPN / RDP setup. The VPN connects to a Smoothwall UTM, they join a seperate VLAN with no other internal devices on it. To connect with the VPN they require the certs and the setup config. These are only given to employees.

They also login with thier credentials. The network they join has firewall rules blocking everything but 3389/RDP permit to one dedicated internal RDP server. As an extra, we have firewall rules in place to block all countries but our own and passwords are force changed regularly.